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There is increasingevidence to suggestthata fundamental source ofinformation onhow to
access and use new technologies in a rural production context comes from interactionwith
neighbouring farmers1. Economic research on adoption of innovations has only partially
addressed the issue of how the social structure of a village can a¤ect the exchange of
information, the adoption and the …nal impact of the innovation to farmers’ productivity
(Feder and Slade 1984; Bevan et al 1989; Pomp and Burger 1995; Foster and Rosenzweig
1995, Conley and Udry 2002).
Previous work on Côte d’Ivoire reveals a negative bias against non-autochthonous
farmers in accessing institutional knowledge, in the form of extension services. This
…nding relates to the “ethnic sequence” in the history of integration of non-indigenous
communities in cocoa growing areas of the country; the recent crisis in the cocoa and
co¤ee market combined with the recent political instability deeply changed this precari-
ous equilibrium (see Leonard and Oswald, in Ruf, F. and Siswoputranto, P.S. (eds) 1995).
This paperinvestigatesthe extentto whichinformation ‡owswithinand between di¤erent
ethnic groups in the village. The key idea is that culturally more homogeneous farmers
will interact more, and therefore share more information about technological innovations.
In this context it was shown that minorities create strong and e¢cient networks to safe-
guardtheir diversity (FederandO’Mara1982, Fafchamps 2000, Ruf, 1995). Mostprevious
work in this …eld is limited by lack of access to panel data and by identi…cation problems
resulting from the de…nition of networks2. This paper attempts to avoid these identi-
…cation problems through two devices: …rst by not using the traditional average e¤ect
approach to networks, but rather trying to develop a variable to express the probability of
1For a seminal paper in this …eld see Case (1992)
2For a detailed discussion of identi…cation problems in network analysis see Manski (1993) and and
Ravallion (2002).
2each farmer to access knowledge through his/her participation in the network and his/her
ethnic characteristics; second by using a short panel dataset.
Section 2 will investigate the relationship between social structure and formation of
networks, while section 3 will describe the simple model used to test the theory. Section
4 will describe the data available to test the hypothesis and section 5 will introduce
some preliminary results on the ethnic component. Section 6 will set up the empirical
formulation, Section 7 will illustrate the main results and section 8 will conclude.
2 Technology adoption and social structure
Being a member of a community gives a farmer the advantage of sharing information
on production techniques and innovations: this simple but sensible idea has produced
interesting theoretical developments that have led to important empirical …ndings. In
the last 20 years, evidence suggested that the way in which societies are organized and
social groupsinteract canhave an impact onthe di¤usion of knowledge and its consequent
impact on the productivity of crops (Banerjee, 1992; Case, 1992; Besley and Case, 1994;
Foster and Rosenzweig 1995, Conley and Udry, 2001). While these studies provided an
invaluable theoretical platform to better understand the role of networks, there is still a
lack of clarity on the role of social structures in determining the amount and the qual-
ity of the exchange of information among neighbours. This aspect remains di¢cult to
model, as it is deeply rooted into the social characteristics of the environment where the
empirical analysis is carried out. It is important and often di¢cult to distinguish between
the e¤ect deriving from the characteristics of the individual and the social capital e¤ect,
which concerns the entire community attitude towards sharing knowledge. Rogers (1995)
uses well-established theories in sociology, psychology, and communications to develop
a concise approach to the di¤usion of innovations: di¤usion takes place within the con-
3text of structures of social relationships based on power, norms and public acceptability.
Communication networks (who you know), structure (what is your place in the chain of
communication) and proximity (degree of overlapping personal communication between
members) are all key elements in predicting adoption and, ultimately, the impact on pro-
ductivity of farmers. While the literature on empirical testing of these theories is rather
limited, some interesting results have emerged in the context of ethnic homogeneity and
e¢ciency (Kanbur 1992; Baland and Plateau 1995; Fafchamps 2000). In the more speci…c
context of peer e¤ects and ethnic homogeneity recentpapersby Munshi and Myaux (1998)
and Munshi (2002) …nd evidence that similar ethnic origins and religious a¢liations have
a role in explaining the adoptionof innovation in the context ofsanitation andagricultural
production respectively.
As previously noticed, it is di¢cult to understand the role of social structures without
considering the speci…c social context. Prior to proposing a model we therefore need
to understand the setting. Previous work on Côte d’Ivoire has focused on the positive
impact ofextension services onthe productivity of farmers, mainly asfar asfoodcrops are
concerned (Romani 2002). The central idea is that the farmer who receives extension, and
has invested in the acquisition of information about the innovation, may in the course of
this process communicate with neighbours, maybe to receive help with the application of
the innovation, or additional advice. The mainresult of that analysis is a positive e¤ect of
extension services on food crops, but not on the more valuable perennial crops (co¤ee and,
most importantly, cocoa). Thisisthe resultof the crisisinthe international pricesof these
soft commodities over the last few years. Old plantations were not maintained properly
or replaced by new ones, causing a decrease in yield levels. Extension became increasingly
unable to sustain the cocoa sector in particular, in a context where farmers were turning
their e¤ort to food crops to provide for their households. Farmers turned to crops like
maize and cassava as they can be grown on short term fallows and require little work.
4Lowlandswere also exploited with ‡oodedrice, whichbecame increasingly important. The
use of inputs in the cocoa production almost stopped: especially anti-parasites equipment
was not maintained and became unusable. An interesting case study from a village in the
Gban region in central Côte d’Ivoire reveals that once the farmers realized that the price
crisis was there to stay and was not temporary as some of the previous ones, they stopped
any maintenance of cocoa plots, sometimes leaving abandoned as much as 5 ha of land
(Chavueau in Ruf, F. and Siswoputranto, P.S. (eds) 1995). This profound change in the
economic structure of the village went along with a reorganizationof the ethnic hierarchy:
this change exacerbated social tensions in a delicate and complex political moment, in
which ethnic di¤erences played a critical role. While it is di¢cult to generalize, three
farmers groups can be identi…ed: indigenous farmers, …rst stage immigrants and second
stage immigrants. Indigenous farmers are - historically - the wealthiest group; they own
the best land and are experienced cocoa and co¤ee growers. First stage immigrants are
established households who moved to the cocoa and co¤ee growing regions from other
areas of Côte d’Ivoire mainly in the 1970s and 1980s. They usually own some land and,
despite the fact that they …rst moved to supply labour to the wealthy indigenous farmers,
they are reputed to be experienced and dynamic cocoa and co¤ee growers. Second stage
immigrants have recently arrived to cocoa and co¤ee growing regions to be employed as
workforce. They may have established themselves as small growers, but only rarely own
the land they cultivate. Traditionally the hierarchy between the groups depends crucially
on the quantity and quality of their perennial crops holdings, which is why the recent
crisis has deeply changed the balance of power within the communities.
We propose a simple model to integrate these aspects by focusing on two characteris-
tics of the di¤usion of knowledge. In the …rst place the greater the opportunity of meeting
and discussing among farmers the higher is the probability for the farmer to exchange in-
formation with “knowledgeable” neighbours and replicate the innovation. We can de…ne
5this dimension through the presence of participatory organizations in the village as a tool
to construct e¤ective networks among the nearby farmers and increase the probability
of exchange3. Secondly the extent to which innovative farmers will be willing to share
such information may vary according to farmers’ characteristics. We argue, in line with
the literature reviewed earlier, that the greater the similarity in terms of backgrounds,
customs and language among the farmers, the higher is the probability the information
will be passed on - what is known as the peer-group e¤ect (Pomp and Bruger 1995).
Recent models of proximity prefer a more complex concept of distance to a merely ge-
ographical de…nition; this is de…ned over di¤erent spheres of household characteristics,
geographical and not (Conley and Ligon 1998), more on the lines of a “social proxim-
ity”. Ethnic characteristics are a suitable dimension to de…ne the likelihood of interaction
among households, particularly, as we said, in the context of the crisis. Since the begin-
ning of the 1990s ethnic a¢liations have determinedvarious patternsof landaccumulation
and production choices.
While similar research was conducted in some recent literature, often the results were
based on cross sectional data. As noticed in Ravallion (2002) testing for externalities
among units located in the same geographical areas with cross sectional data poses crit-
ical identi…cation problems: individual outcomes and geographical variables are likely to
be correlated. This is an endogenous e¤ect due to the households’ unobservable charac-
teristics, and therefore origin of non-causal correlations: “better” farmers might decide
to live in a speci…c area to enhance their production levels (say because of an unobserved
characteristic, such as land quality). Their neighbourhood variable would then seem to
determine e¢ciency, while it is simply proxing for their skillful choice to live in higher po-
tential areas. The availability of a panel dataset allows us to use a …xed e¤ect model that
3By Participatory organizations we meanorganizations that bring together village members to discuss
common problems and determine possible solutions.
6increases signi…cantly the capability to identify externalities and network e¤ects among
households “cleaned” of possible spurious e¤ects which would invalidate the precision of
the result. Fixed e¤ects techniques, through …rst di¤erencing, allow static unobservable
di¤erences (such as land quality and farmer’s abilities - at least in the short run) to be
controlled for by looking at how variations in e¢ciency are determined by variations of
farmers and environment characteristics (such as membership in networks in our case).
Althoughthese techniques have representeda leap forwardinthe empirical literature, they
are not a panacea. If there is an unobservable dynamic e¤ect, i.e. we believe that it may
in‡uence the ability to change rather than (only) the levels of e¢ciency, then …xed e¤ects
techniques will not be su¢cient to guarantee identi…cation. Manski (1993) discusses what
information is necessary to identify whether the average behaviour of a certain reference
group in‡uences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group. Inference isnot
possible unless some prior informationspecifyingthe compositionof the groupisavailable,
and the relationship between the variables de…ning reference groups and those directly
a¤ecting outcomes are moderately related in the population. This condition, that derives
from what is known as the re‡ection problem, is one of the main hurdles to clear results
in the existing literature. The aim of this paper is to combine a model that takes into
account explicitly the composition of the networks with …xed e¤ect estimation techniques
that try to address the identi…cation problems highlighted by this critique of the existing
literature.
3 The model
The starting platform used in this analysis is the Feder and Slade model of technology
adoption in the context of agricultural production (Feder and Slade 1984). We expand it
to include knowledge similarly to what is proposed in Isham (forthcoming): a production
7function that, besides the usual inputs, is increasing in knowledge
Yi = F(Li;g(Ki);Ni) (1)
where Yi is the total production for farmer i, Ki is his/her knowledge about the
innovation, Li is land and Ni is the positive amount of the variable input used by farmer i
that islikely to be a¤ectedby the introduced innovation. The general impactof knowledge
originates from g(:)whichis a concave function. AsK increases, g(:) converges to anupper
limit g¤ as the farmer’s cumulative knowledge increases to its maximum . Farmers who
do not receive extension are limited to K0 and, consequently, to g
¤
0 while farmers that
receive extension can accumulate knowledge up to K1 and reach g¤
1 > g¤
0. We expand this
model introducing the concept of probability of accessing knowledge. For the moment,
we restrict the knowledge to be categorical: either people know how to use the input
optimally (K = 1) or they don’t (K = 0), so that g can only assume values g¤
0 or g¤
1 (we
will relax this assumption at a later stage). The knowledge, by allowing g to take the
top value g¤
1 will have the potential to boost the overall output Y. The probability of
accessing the information for a farmer who is involved in extension is, by de…nition, unity.
The probability for a farmer who is not in extension “to know” must be lower than 1.
Let us consider a social context where there are N = 1; ::i:::; n individuals who are not
members of extension and M = 1;::j::;m individuals in extension. Each “social context”
will be one village, so that individuals i and individuals j will be neighbours. At each
moment t an event occurs: the event is either an interaction between two members of the
two di¤erent groupsor nothing. We can de…ne ￿ as the distribution generating function of
these events. An interaction between i and j happens with probability ￿ij. If ￿ij > 0 then
i and j become partners and the information is exchanged.4 We are interested in de…ning
4The model used here is a slightly modi…ed version of a model analysed in Raub and Weesie (1990).
8such a probability function. In words: what makes i more or less likely to interact and
exchange information with a member of M? We believe this probability to depend on two
parameters: the number of “knowledgeable” farmers linked directly to the farmer i , (Bi),
and the fact that these farmers might be more or less willing to share the information,
(vj):
￿ij = ￿(Bi;vj) (2)
So ￿ij, at this point, can be simply introduced into our farmer’s production function,
which will be:
Yi = F(Li; ￿ij;Ni) (3)
Notice that ￿ij now represents the probability of accessing our K = 1 and therefore to
reach g¤
1: in other words, in this simpli…ed model, the probability might change but the
quality ofthe informationisthe same for all. This could be, for example, a set instructions
to use a new seed: either the farmer knows how to use it or he/she does not know.
Let us now relax the assumption that knowledge is discrete, and allow for its accumu-
lation. Concretely we can think about a more diversi…ed extension system that provides
information about several crops and techniques, which increases with exposure to the
agent and varies from farmer to farmer. This will not change our de…nition of probability
of knowing, but will add a new variable in our already augmented production function,
which is the knowledge function we de…ned before:
Yi = F(Li;￿ij;g(Ki); Ni) (4)
Where now K is a stock variable, free to take any positive value. The magnitude of
9K will depend on the overall stock of knowledge available in the network of farmer i.
Overall productivity is increasing in ￿ij (the probability of knowing) and in knowledge
g(Ki). Notice how now the impact of knowledge on total output will be conditional to ￿ij,
the probability of accessing such knowledge. We can de…ne ￿¤K as the value of expected
knowledge available to farmers.
4 The data
The data comes from a panel data survey managed by ANADER on a sample of 2500
households evenly spread across the territory. The survey was collected between 1997 and
2000, and contains information about production during the ending farming season (so
data collected in 1999 pertain to the 1998-1999 farming season). This survey is collected
among a sub-sample of a bigger survey (comprising more than 10000 households), with
additional information about the households, collected only once in 1997. This data was
also available for the analysis. The panel data survey focused on farmer’s production
capabilities, with precise information about single plots and crops for each household.
Both the panel sub-sample and the bigger cross sectional sample include information
about the ethnic origin of the household and on the membershipinbothextension services
(only available for the sub-sample) and in participatory organizations (available for both
the panel and the cross sectional sample)5. Table 1 summarizes the trends in average
production per household, average total land surface per household, average crop density,
and yields for of some of the crops object of the analysis during the period 1998-2000.
6
The yield levels for cocoa seem to have deteriorated considerably from 1998 to 2000.
Quite interestingly the average size of the cocoa cultivated areas tend to decrease sub-
5There are di¤erent kindof cooperatives recordedinthe survey: productiongroups,marketinggroups,
production cooperatives, trade unions and other groups. Given that in each village, though, only 1
organization is present, we aggregate them in to one category.
6For further information about the survey structure and the sampling procedures see Appendix 1.
10stantially, especially from 1999 to 2000. This result is consistent with the more accurate
analysis possible through panel data: in fact following the households from period to pe-
riod we come to a similar conclusion. With the exception of a few farmers who increased
cocoa cultivated areas extensively, on average there was a contraction in the size of cocoa
cultivated areas. No information was provided in the survey as to whether the farmers ac-
tually removedcocoa trees or simply didnot use their full potential of cultivation, perhaps
not using the older trees. The anthropological survey carried out by J.P. Chavueau in the
Gban region in central Côte d’Ivoire, o¤ers an interesting insight over the new cultural
arrangements over the greater competition for limited resources resulting from the slump
in the cocoa cycle. Often farmers decided not to maintain old plantations, to give space
for newforestgrowthand terrain renewal as, in theirjudgement, the costof forgoing cocoa
production in a period of depressed prices is lower than the present value of the pro…t of
expected future production. Facing una¤ordable prices for inputs such as pesticides and
fertilizers, farmers extended the size of their plantations, without maintaining them ac-
curately, given the very low marginal cost of expanding the cultivated surface (Chavueau
in Ruf, F. and Siswoputranto, P.S. (eds) 1995). Generally, whatever the solution adopted
by the farmers, the result is a contraction of the average cocoa operation con…rmed by
the decrease in average output per household. Similar conclusions, regarding the size of
the plots, can be drawn from the analysis of the co¤ee data. The reduction in output is
also drastic: this could be due to a reduction in the e¤ort and land dedicated to co¤ee
cultivation and harvesting during a period of low prices and consequent low pro…tability.
The case study mentioned above helps us understand some of the factors connected to
the labour input as well. Bigger farms adapted quickly to the new constraints, reducing
drastically the daily labour hired for the maintenance of the plots. Smaller farmers, given
the lack of secondary inputs, had to increasingly rely on labour to maintain production
11levels as far as it was possible (and convenient) to substitute these two factors.7 This
was done almost exclusively by using family labour, as they could not a¤ord hired labour.
Eventually, as the pro…tability of the cocoa plantations kept decreasing, farmers started
moving their e¤ort (and their family labour force) away from perennials to focus on food
crops.
Table 2 summarizes the information about ethnic origin by region. The distinction
is between indigenous farmers, non indigenous farmers (which are farmers belonging to
di¤erent kin but of Ivorian citizenship) and foreign farmers. The regions where cocoa
and co¤ee are grown experienced signi…cant immigration in the past, particularly during
the boom years in the cocoa markets of the 80s and early 90s. Despite the innovations
in the production techniques, the high level of cocoa production in the country from
1988 onwards can be attributed to the new migrations associated with deforestation and
creation of new plantations. This is particularly true for the south-west cocoa growing
region, which developed only after the opening of the road from Abidjan to Sassandra8.
All these areas held the largest reserves of primary forest in the country. The government
limited the customary rights of native people and practically gave away the forests as free
concessions to the newcomers. The opening up of these forest lands induced a huge in‡ux
of immigrant labour, coming mostly from the north of the country and from neighbouring
Mali and Burkina Faso (these are the farmers classi…ed as non-autochthonous in the
survey). The government, following the slogan “the land belongs to those who develop it”
assuredthe transferof land to farmerswho would show the ability to quickly develop their
small holdings. This mechanism of exchanging land for labourfuelled a sort of “gold rush”
to the forest, accompanied by a mushrooming of frontier settlements. Land settlement
and deforestation continued in a inevitable self-feeding mechanism in which the strongly
7Ruf (1995).
8For a comprehensive description of the migration ‡ows inCôte d’Ivoire, see Ruf (1993), chapter 3, p.
199-221.
12needed extra labour could be attracted only by providing the newcomers with land to
settle on. Older settlements, owned by indigenous farmers, found it increasingly di¢cult
to compete the new frontier areas where newer trees and abundant cheap workforce were
available.
Yam and cocoa inter-planting methods were widely adopted by the newcomers. Cocoa
is planted in April/May, then plantain and cassava are added to the …elds. The marginal
cost of growing cocoa in this setting is close to nothing, thanks to the almost perfect
complementarities among these plants. The food crops remunerate, during the …rst year,
the investmentinthe plot. Afterthe yam is harvested, the cocoa provides for weedcontrol,
reducing maintenance work required. Density of the cocoa trees is then reduced until
productionperiod. The sustainability ofthiswidespreadsystem isnotvery good, andafter
some years of exploitation it reaches its “ecological ceiling”. Bad timing made this stage
correspond, for many of the settlements, with the decrease in international prices. This
was another factor that caused farmers to increase their food crop cultivations, especially
in the form of shade-food crops, which grow underneath the cocoa trees (Chavueau in
Ruf, F. and Siswoputranto, P.S. (eds) 1995).
5 The role of ethnic diversity
The probability of accessing knowledge which was de…ned in section 3 is the key element
in our model. We seek a de…nition for the two main determinants of the probability
which we described earlier on: the number of “knowledgeable” farmers that the “non-
knowledgeable” farmer i knows (B) and the fact that these farmers might be more or
less willing to share the information with our farmer (v). We use information about
membership in cooperatives to de…ne the network of each farmer. We assume, by this,
that farmers who belong to cooperatives have a signi…cantly higher chance of meeting
13among themselves in a context in which they are likely to discuss production issues9.
This is justi…ed by the fact that cooperatives are sociable places, where the farmer goes
regularly to sell his goods, to purchase inputs or simply to check the most recent prices
before heading for the nearby market. Cooperatives, normally, do not o¤er production
advice, but mainly marketing services or - in some cases - the sale of inputs. According
to local experts, membership in cooperatives does not imply anymore better access to
inputs, as was the case previously. In fact these institutions, during the crisis period,
lacked the cash‡ow needed to make big purchases of inputs. Still they seem to play an
important role as information centres where farmers meet to discuss production issues.
Once we have characterized the network-participation of farmers by their membership
in a cooperative, we can calculate the probability of meeting a neighbour in extension(B):
it will be equal to the number of cooperative members who are also extension members
over the total number of cooperative members in the community. To de…ne the second
determinant we startfrom the fact that ethnic diversity seems to play an importantrole in
determining membership in extension. Table 3 and 3.1 report some descriptive statistics
on access to extension and the results of a probit estimation on the factors that make a
household more or less likely to be a member of an extension group.
We include a number of households characteristics on the right hand side, of which
we report only the most important ones. Interestingly the results indicate that belonging
to the non autochthonous ethnic group reduces signi…cantly the probability of being a
member of extension services, even after controlling for other household characteristics.
This result should be interpreted more as a descriptive statistic rather than as causal
e¤ect as this very simple cross sectional estimation is undermined by some identi…cation
9The dataset contains information about membership in several types of cooperatives, which we gen-
eralized in one category. This will not cause probalmes, as far as networks are concerned, as in each
community there is rarely more than one cooperative. The heterogeneity of cooperative types - in other
words, is intervillage and not intrevillage.
14problems. Most importantly it is di¢cult to rule out the possibility of selection bias
into extension services. It maybe the case that good farmers seek extension or that
extension is particularly designedto help farmers who cultivate speci…c crops. The nature
of the extension scheme in Côte d’Ivoire, though, helps to address this issue: agents are
located homogeneously on the territory and provide information on all crops, not only on
perennials
10. We can take this result one step further and look at whether ethnic origin
has an overall e¤ect on the characteristics of the farming activity, i.e. whether - once they
receive extension - they bene…t from it as much as households belonging to the dominant
ethnic group. Table 4 reports the results from a production function …xed e¤ect panel
regression for the entire sample during the period 1998-2000. The results are similar to
the ones reported in Romani (2002), but the e¤ect of extension is now interacted with
the ethnic origin of the farmers and the type of crop (food crops and perennials). The
coe¢cients on the interaction variables tell us, therefore, what is the impact of extension
services on food crops and commercial crops for the two ethnic categories separately.
Interestingly the positive e¤ect on food crops, which was the main result found in that
study, seems to be common for both autochthonous and non autochthonous farmers, but
with only a signi…cant di¤erence in the magnitude of the impact11. This indicates that
in the (relatively unlikely) case in which the ethnic non-autochthonous farmers do receive
extension, they are able to bene…t from it a little less than the households belonging to
dominant ethnic groups. Are non-indigenous farmers more or less e¤ective in farming?
We cannot answer this question looking at our …xed e¤ect regression, given that the
ethnic origin is part of the unobservable characteristics “swept out” by our …xed e¤ects
estimates. We therefore look at the production function derived from the cross sectional
survey collected on the same farmers in 1997. We run a production function including
10For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Romani (2002).
11The positive e¤ect of extension is inline with the literature (for a review of studies onthe impact of
extension services see Evanson, forthcoming).
15a number of characteristics of the households to compensate for the lack of control for
unobservable di¤erences, given that now we are not using a …xed e¤ect technique. Results
are reported in table 5; they indicate that the ethnic minorities are not disadvantaged in
food crops production and, on the contrary, seem to be advantaged as far as perennial
crops are concerned, even after controlling for the age of the plants. This is an important
factor, given that most foreign and non autochthonous farmers moved to cocoa growing
areas during the cocoa boom in the 80s and, therefore, tend to have younger and more
productive trees. Indeed the age of the trees, and perhaps the adoption of di¤erent
perennial/annual crop combinations are at the basis of the di¤erent e¤ects of cocoa-cycles
on indigenous and non-indigenous farmers (Ruf, 1995).
In this section we identi…ed two main facts:
1. Foreign and non-indigenous farmers are less likely to be involved in extension
services and therefore to become members of extension groups
2. Once they are members of extension they bene…t from it less than the dominant
ethnic group members.
It is clear that the ethnic origin of the farmers plays a role in determining whether
and in what ways the information that arrives into the village through extension e¤ects
productivity. We therefore will model our parameter v, the willingness to share informa-
tion, along ethnic lines. This will allow us to construct probabilities which vary according
to the ethnic origin of the farmer and the ethnic speci…c share of knowledgeable farmers
he/she can meet through cooperatives. The key idea is that farmers tend to interact more
within their own ethnic group, even if they belong to a mixed common network, such as
a cooperative.
With v and B we nowhave the two elements to de…ne the overall probability “ofknow-
ing a neighbour who knows” in each village. This little table summarizes the probability
16for each group:
Probability of “knowing a neighbour who knows” Membership in extension
yes no
Membership in the cooperative yes Pr[K = 1] = 1 0 · Pr[K = 1] · 1
network no Pr[K = 1] = 1 Pr[K = 1] = 0
The case in which 0 · Pr[K = 1] · 1 (not a member of extension but a member of the
cooperative network), the probability is equal to:
￿i =
# of village members who belong to the cooperative and to extension
tot # of village members who belong to the cooperative
(5)
which is the probability of “knowing a neighbour who knows” as this is de…ned for each
village
12. Including the ethnical component the probability becomes :
»
￿i =
# of village members who belong to the cooperative, to extension and of i’s ethnic group
tot # of village members who belong to the cooperative of i’s ethnic group
(6)
which is the probability “of knowing a neighbour who knows of my ethnic group”.
Next we relax the assumption of K taking only values 0 and 1, and we consider K
being an accumulable stock of knowledge (K ¸ 0). We want K to increase with the
overall amount of knowledge present in i’s village. We de…ne, therefore, K as the number
of members of the extension group present in i’s community. We then derive the values
for the “expected knowledge” very simply in the following manner:
￿i ¤K =
# of village members who belong to the cooperative and to extension
tot # of village members who belong to the cooperative
¤K (7)
12We consider people wholive in the same village as neighbours aswe do nothave accessto information
on distances among them. The relatively small size of villages makes this assumption not too irrealistic.




# of village members who belong to the cooperative, to extension and of i’s ethnic group
tot # of village members who belong to the cooperative of i’s ethnic group
¤K.
(8)
Notice that these variables, by construction, will take values between 0 and K.
6 The Empirical Formulation
The mainhypothesis deriving from the simple theoretical model is thatinformation moves
more ‡uidly between neighbours with ahigher social proximity (in terms ofourmodel with
a higher v, i.e. the amount of information farmers share in the network). In other words
we expect the g
¤j￿ (that is the upper limit of the impact of information on production,
given a certain probability of accessing knowledge) to be higher among “homogeneous”
ethnic groups. We will arrive to this test gradually.








where lit represents …xed inputs and nit variable inputs. Cultivated land constitutes
the …xed input, and it is crop speci…c. Only limited information is available on variable
inputs, in particular for labour for which the only information we can use is the number
of working age members in the household over the number of plots belonging to the
household. While it would be preferable to have more precise information such as hours
worked, in the context of the crisis hired labour is a form of input that only few larger
farms can a¤ord. Indeed, as noticed in Ruf and Siswoputranto (1995), bigger families were
18advantaged during the crisis period when due to the lack of other inputs more intense
labourwas the only response: “Such astrategy isonly possible whenfarmershave a sizable
family work force (...) this explains why the strategy is mostly adopted by planters who
migrated from Burkina Faso and Mali. These ethnic groups can rely on their family or
village networks to provide them with a stable but not too demanding labour force.”13
The number of household members per plot seems also to …t well the labour patterns
observed in the country, where each one or two household members (according to the
overall size of the family) are allocated speci…c plots that they are responsible for (Udry
and Du‡o, 2001). We propose to …rst test for our simpler model (equation 3), in which
knowledge K takes only values 0 or 1 (the case in which we hypothesized - to clarify the








where ￿it is the probability “of knowing a neighbour who knows” as de…ned in (5). We
assume that the probability enters our relationship exponentially similarly to extension.
Linearizing and adding the error term and the …xed e¤ects we obtain:
logyit = logA(z)+ al loglit + anlognit + aextextit + a￿￿it + "it +!i (11)
This equation will therefore test whether the probability of knowing somebody who has
access to extension, whatever his or her ethnic group, is associated with higher output
levels controlling for other determinants of production. This can be interpreted as a test
of the amount of knowledge sharing among network members.
13See Ruf and Siswoputranto, 1995 (p.138). While more precise information on labour, such as hours
worked, would be preferable, it could introduce some simultaneity between the regressor and the error
term. If in fact unobservable shocks were to be correlated with the labour variable the coe¢cient of
the regressor would be biased. Using an exogenous measure such as number of household members over
number of plots to proxy for labour solves this problem.
19Secondly we introduce the ethnic element. Now we will be testing whether the prob-
ability of knowing somebody who knows and is a member of the same ethnic group is










Log-linearizing and adding the error term and the …xed e¤ects we obtain the following
linear speci…cation:
logyit = logA(z)+ al loglit + anlognit + aextextit + a￿
»
￿it + "it +!i (13)
where
»
￿it is the ethnic speci…c probability de…ned in (6). This equation tests whether
there is an intra ethnic exchange of information.
We proceed similarly to construct the empirical formulations for the“expected knowl-
edge” model, using the de…nitions given in (7) and (8) where K is the number of extension
members in each community. First without the ethnic element in the de…nition of the
networks:
logyit = logA(z) +alloglit + anlognit + aextextit + a￿(￿it ¤ K)+ "it + !i (14)
and with the ethnic-speci…c probability:
logyit = logA(z)+ al loglit + anlognit + aextextit + a￿(
»
￿it ¤ K)+ "it +!i (15)
It is likely that the proportions of members in cooperatives, extension and ethnic
groups are correlated to some unobservable local features (think for example at some
characteristics resulting from the history of the village). As far as these e¤ects are time-
20invariant (as they are likely to be at least in the short time spanavailable for the analysis)
the …xed e¤ect technique will enable us to control for such di¤erences which will not,
therefore, bias the point estimates.
7 The results
Table 6 summarizes the results of the …xed e¤ects regression for the …rst speci…cation,
where K can take only discrete values. Column one andtwo reportthe results for the non-
ethnic based de…nition of the probability, as in equation (11). The di¤erence between the
two columns is the following: while in the …rst one the probability variable incorporates
the result due to direct extension (in other words extension members have a probability
of knowing equal to one), the second column splits the variable in two, the direct e¤ect of
extension and the e¤ect of the probability of knowing for people who are not in extension.
The results in column one indicate that there is a strong e¤ect of the probability of
knowing for the food crops, with a coe¢cient of 0.616. Once we split the probability
variable, though, we observe that while the direct extension coe¢cient stays positive
and signi…cant (with coe¢cient implying an elasticity around 60%
14, in line with the
results obtained in Romani 2002) the network coe¢cient does not stay signi…cant. This
result therefore excludes ane¤ect linked to the exchange of information between extension
members and non-extensionmembersthroughthe networks. Incolumns3 and 4we repeat
the exercise but now de…ning probabilities along ethnic lines as in equation (13). Column
3 reports the result incorporating the direct extension e¤ect in the probability variable.
Again the probability seems to be associated with higher output levels for food crops,
with a coe¢cient varying between 1.13 for the dominant ethnic group to 0.69 for the non
14the formula used toobtainthe elasticity to extension isthe following: 100¤g = 100¤fexp(c)¡1g were
g is the relative e¤ect (so that 100¤ g is the percentage e¤ect, and c is the estimated coe¢cinet for the
dummy variable). See Halvorsen and Palmquist (1990) for details about the calculation of dichotomous
variables elasticity in a semi logarithmic setting.
21autochthonous ethnic groups. Once we split the result between extension and probability
of knowing (for people not in extension) the direct extension e¤ect for food crops stays
positive and signi…cant (with the usual coe¢cient implying an elasticity of 60%), but
there is no evidence of any e¤ect linked to the exchange of information between extension
members and non members within each ethnic group. Basically we cannot identify any
network e¤ect when we de…ne knowledge as a dichotomous variable.
In Table 7 we proceed to relax the assumption on K being discrete and we adopt the
model where knowledge is a stock variable (as described in equation 14). We carry out
similar tests, but nowthe probability variables will represent the expected knowledge, and
take values between 0 and K. The results reported in column 1 indicate that once we split
the variable into a direct extension e¤ect and an expected knowledge e¤ect for farmers
not in extension, the coe¢cient associated with expected knowledge for food crops stays
signi…cant (now at the 5% level) and positive, witha magnitude of 0.109. Notice that this
result does not supplant the e¤ect of direct extension, which stays basically unchanged
with a coe¢cient implying an elasticity of about 60%. This result provides evidence
that there is an exchange of information going on between extension members and non-
members withinthe network. Do all neighbours exchange the same amountof information
regardless of their ethnic origin? To answer this question we proceed to test the …nal
model proposed, where the expected knowledge variable is de…ned along ethnic lines,
as described by equation 15. Column 3 reports the result where we distinguish between
the direct extension e¤ect and the expected knowledge e¤ect, now de…ned for each ethnic
group separately. Againwe …nd the familiarresultfor directextensionon food crops (with
the usual elasticity a little above 60%); the result for expected knowledge is also positive
and signi…cant, with a coe¢cient of 0.116 for non-indigenous farmers but non-signi…cant
for the ethnic autochthonous ones. This result suggests that farmers belonging to ethnic
minorities who are excluded from extension services bene…t from exchanging information
22with their ethnic peers who are members of extension. So, even if these farmers are not
as likely as farmers belonging to the dominant ethnic group to be extension members,
they have a way of accessing and bene…tting from the information that reaches their
communities.
15 Column 4 of Table 7 provides an additional test to our theory. Here
we de…ne total knowledge available in the village along ethnic lines, i.e. summing up
the presence of extension separately for indigenous and non-indigenous farmers. In this
speci…cation we want, therefore, to assign to farmers in a speci…c ethnic group only the
knowledge stock available intheir own ethnic group. This is particularly important for the
ethnic minority, given the discrimination they face in accessing knowledge. The results
do not change signi…cantly from the pervious ones, con…rming the presence of a network
e¤ect within non-indigenous farmer groups.
Two potential identi…cation problems remain to be addressed. It maybe possible
that non autochthonous farmers rely on their ethnic piers to access extra workforce in
moments of need. It is not clear whether this e¤ect may be channelled through the
cooperative membership. Should this be the case, the cooperative-network variable might
be correlated with this source of extra labour, introducing an alternative explanation for
the positive coe¢cient of the network variable in the ethnic speci…c setting (table 7). To
address this problem we use information available from the cross-sectional survey of 1997.
Table 8 shows the sources of hired workforce for farmers belonging to the autochthonous
and non-autochthonous groups, andformembers and non members ofcooperatives. While
it is clear from the table that non-autochthonous farmers rely more on non-autochthonous
workers (as suggested by Ruf, 1995) it is not evident that membership in cooperatives
ampli…es this behaviour.
15This result is robust to other speci…cations which were tested, notably to rede…ning the production
function in terms of output values, using price information. The results were also tested for robustness
using, when considering knowledge as a stock variable, a total knowledge variable instead of a direct
extension dummy to control for extension e¤ect. These additional results are available from the author.
23The second potential identi…cation problem concerns the limits of …xed e¤ects models.
As already mentioned, if the variation in e¢ciency observed is linked to an unobservable
dynamic e¤ect correlated to the ethnic-network variable, then …xed e¤ects will not be
su¢cient to guarantee identi…cation. While it is not easy to think of such an e¤ect,
this remains a limitation. Due to the short nature of this panel it is not feasible to
apply multiple-di¤erencing techniques to control for such e¤ects. Once additional data is
available this wouldbe a natural furtherstepto understand the mechanisms ofinformation
sharing.
8 Conclusions
This paper investigates the role of knowledge networks in determining yields. In partic-
ular we investigate the role of social proximity, interpreted not only as physical vicinity
but also as ethnic similarity among neighbours. To do so we de…ned the probability as
knowing a neighbour who has accessto the knowledge, which was di¤used to some farmers
only in the community by an extension agent. Such probability is identi…ed by three char-
acteristics: geographical vicinity, membershipin a network organization andthe extent to
which people are ready to share with their neighbours. To proxy these variables we used
a panel dataset collected in Côte d’Ivoire in the period between 1997 and 2000 and con-
taining detailed information on agricultural production, on membership in organizations
and institutions and on the ethnic origins of farmers. The latter is used to de…ne “social
proximity”, and hence the farmer’s willingness to share knowledge with neighbours. We
test two distinct models …rst treating knowledge as a dichotomous variable and then as
a stock variable, which increases proportionally with the amount of extension services
o¤ered in the community. We use a panel data …xed e¤ects methodology to identify this
e¤ect.
24The following conclusions can be derived from the results: …rst non autochthonous
farmers are less likely to become members of extension services. Secondly, unlike their
neighbours belonging to the autochthonous ethnic group, they bene…t signi…cantly - in
terms of higher yields in food crops - from exchanging information among themselves.
This result is true only when we de…ne knowledge as an accumulable stock variable, a
hypothesis which seems reasonable in the Ivorian context. More work is necessary to
identify the workings of this sort of re-equalization mechanism adopted by the ethnic
minorities. In particular future work should look at whether this ethnic network e¤ect is
still present in areas where there is no bias against non autochthonous farmers’ access to
knowledge through extension.
258.1 Appendix 1 - Sampling methods and survey structure
The data used for this analysis come from a survey carried out by ANADER, a specialized
agency of the ministry of agriculture of the government of Côte d’Ivoire. The project
had two phases. In 1996/1997 a …rst survey was carried out with the aim of collecting
information about the production capability, marketing facilities and standard of living of
a nationally representative sample of farmers in the country. 262 localities were selected
randomly and 25 or 50 households were surveyed within each locality selected (according
to the size of the locality extracted, see following table). The sample was strati…ed by
region (there are 10 regions) and the primary sampling units (PSUs - the village/location)
were selected independently in each region. Census lists were created for each selected
PSU and households were then selected randomly from the list.











Total for C.I. 262 10100
A sub-sample was then selected from the original nationally representative sample
with the aim of collecting more detailed information on productivity. The farmers were
selected randomly starting from the original sample. A replacement list was created to
26allow for drop-out for the re-survey in subsequent years. Enumerators received detailed
instructions on land surface and quantity measurement. Information on crop density,
access to extension services and membership in rural organizations was also collected. A
section of the questionnaire was also dedicated to animal husbandry, but unfortunately
the data from this section is available only for one year. No detailed information was
collected on variable inputs such as labour and fertilizers. The following table summarizes
the numberof localities selectedandthe number ofhouseholds ineacharea. Foradditional
details on the structure of the survey see ANADER (2001).











Total for C.I. 250 2100
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29Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Cocoa
Ave. Output Ave. Tot. Ave. Density Ave. yields
land surf. (stems/ha)
1998 Mean 2861.9 2.9 1034.5 943.9
Median 2010.5 2.3 1022.1 888.8
Std. Dev. 2305.5 2.4 315.4 341.7
1999 Mean 2136.4 3.1 982.8 542.2
Median 1476.8 2.2 977 453.3
Std. Dev. 2081.9 2.6 352.1 277.6
2000 Mean 1405.2 1.9 968.9 622.4
Median 966.4 1.3 977 586.7
Std. Dev. 1493.2 1.7 361.8 295.4
Co¤ee
Ave. Output Ave. Tot. Ave. Density Ave. yields
land surf. (stems/ha)
1998 Mean 1840.5 2.6 909.1 371.1
Median 1530 2.1 844.4 357.8
Std. Dev. 1166.2 1.5 278.9 124.35
1999 Mean 1973.1 2.8 911.1 327.2
Median 1592.9 2.3 888.9 333.35
Std. Dev. 1557.5 2.1 324 145.45
2000 Mean 1499.1 2.4 836.2 328.5
Median 1002.4 1.8 800 346.65
Std. Dev. 1475.8 2 257.5 145.8
Rice
Ave. Output Ave. Tot. land surf. Ave. yields
1998 Mean 1421.7 .88 1590.6
Median 1237.5 .77 1625
Std. Dev. 862.6 .54 366.7
1999 Mean 1846.3 .96 1756.9
Median 1350 .83 1812.5
Std. Dev. 1490.1 .54 776.4
2000 Mean 1655.1 .86 1435.9
Median 1232.8 .76 1406.25
Std. Dev. 1340.8 .49 441.5
Yam
Ave. Output Ave. Tot. land surf. Ave. yields
1998 Mean 6687.9 .43 12534.2
Median 5019.6 .33 11500
Std. Dev. 4780.9 .30 3204.2
1999 Mean 6890.4 .46 1462.9
Median 6057.9 .40 13700
Std. Dev. 4914.3 .28 7351.7
2000 Mean 6121.9 .50 9984.75
Median 5324 .41 10045
Std. Dev. 4232.6 .30 2782.5
30Table 2 - ethnic origin by region
Region indigenous non-indigenous foreign
%
North 95.25 4.04 0.71
North East 80.63 5.33 14.04
North West 86.06 10.70 3.24
West 84.72 6.70 8.58
Centre 79.88 8.84 11.28
Centre-North 88.24 7.83 3.93
Centre-East 35.23 24.55 40.23
Centre-West 44.59 23.90 31.52
South-West 17.69 43.08 39.23
South 56.62 16.93 26.45
31Table 3 - Access to extension by ethnic origin












farmer from non-autochthonous ethnic group -.051**
0.018
partic. org 1: -0.48
common production group 0.526
partic. org 2: 0.80***
marketing group (0.000)
partic. org 3: 0.153***
cooperative (0.001)
partic. org 4:. .279
trade union (0.374)
partic. org 5: .046
other groups (0.499)
number of household members .002
(0.260)
Female household head .004
(0.915)
Tot. observations 3364
dF=dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; informal arrangements
is the omitted category in the participatory organizations variables; spatial and temporal
dummies are omitted. P > jzj (reported in parenthesis) are the test of the underlying
coe¢cient being 0; *signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%.
32Table 4 - Fixed e¤ect production function: with ethnic interactions.
with interaction for crops and ethnic origin
ln(crop speci…c output)





on food for autochthonous ethnic group .502***
0.000
on food for non-autochthonous ethnic group .396***
0.007
on perennials for autochthonous ethnic group .031
0.789




average obs. per panel 2.6
R-squared 0.7416
Notes: Ln(output) is the dependent variable. Spatial and crop dummies are not
reported (available from the author). P > jtj in parentheses; *signi…cant at 10%; **
signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%
33Table 5 - Cross section production function with ethnic control variable.
food perennials
ln(output)
ln(crop speci…c plot surf.) .893*** .956***
(0.000) (0.000)
ln(work force) .081*** .045**
(0.002) (0.030)
ln(fertilizers quantity) .026 .124**
(0.254) (0.034)
ln(pesticides quantity) .060* .252***
(0.087) (0.000)
ethnic dummy .034 -.308***
(0=non-indigenous;1=indigenous) (0.757) (0.009)
young trees dummy - -1.167***
(0 if age>5; 1 otherwise) - (0.000)
years of educ. of hh head .015 -.025***
(0.191) (0.000)
Sex of the hh head -.130 -.309
(0=male;1=female) (0.191) (0.025)**
Tot. observations 9769 6726
R-squared 0.30 0.3137
Notes: Ln(output) is the dependent variable. Spatial and crop dummies are not
reported (available from the author). P > jtj in parentheses; *signi…cant at 10%; **
signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%
34Table 6 - Network e¤ects on productivity - discrete K regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Without ethnic element With ethnic element
crop speci…c ln(output)
ln(crop speci…c plot surf.) 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.32*** 1.35***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(hhsize) .316 .593 .184 .601
0.652 0.380 0.794 0.375
direct extension for perennials - .015 - .022
- 0.882 - 0.827
direct extension for food crops - .474*** - .469***
- 0.000 - 0.000
probability of knowing
a neighbour who knows: e¤ect for perennials -.043 -.556 -
0.753 0.169 -
e¤ect for food crops .616*** .037 -
0.000 0.928 -
For perennials and autochthonous ethnic group - - .077 -.844
- - 0.711 0.153
For perennials and non-autochthonous ethnic group - - .221 -.467
- - 0.401 0.574
For food crops and autochthonous ethnic group - - 1.13*** -.411
- - 0.000 0.509
For food crops and non-autochthonous ethnic group - - .692*** .518
- - 0.009 0.575
Tot. observations 1225 1311 1225 1311
Panel individuals 468 506 468 506
average obs. per panel 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
R-squared .7432 .7417 .7436 .7419
Notes: Ln(output) is the dependent variable. Spatial and crop dummies are not
reported (available from the author). P>jtj in parentheses; *signi…cant at 10%; **
signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%Table 7 - Network e¤ects on productivity - expected knowledge regressions.
(1) (2) (3)
Without ethnic element With ethnic element
ethnic speci…c k
crop speci…c ln(output)
ln(crop speci…c plot surf.) 1.38*** 1.38*** 1.38***
0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(lab) .127** .128** .129**
0.051 0.048 0.047
direct extension for perennials .097 .092 0.96
0.336 0.361 0.342
direct extension for food crops .531*** .527*** .531***
0.000 0.000 0.000
Expected knowledge
e¤ect for perennials .085
0.256
e¤ect for food crops .109**
0.042
for perennials and autochthonous ethnic group - -.068 -.067
- 0.696 .699
for perennials and non-autochthonous ethnic group - .114 .159
- 0.176 0.140
for food crops and autochthonous ethnic group - .004 .005
- 0.983 0.982
for food crops and non-autochthonous ethnic group - .116** .191*
- 0.043 0.053
Tot. observations 1285 1284 1284
Panel individuals 501 500 500
average obs. per panel 2.6 2.6 2.6
R-squared 0.7486 0.7487 0.7486
Notes: Ln(output) is the dependent variable. Spatial and crop dummies are not
reported (available from the author). P>jtj in parentheses; *signi…cant at 10%; **
signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%Table 8. Sources of hired workforce by ethnic origin and membership in cooperative.
% of workforce hired from ethnic group:
Member in cooperative
No Yes
Autochth. Autochthonous 52.8 60.6
Farmer’s Non-autochthonous 47.2 39.4
Ethnic
group Non-autochth Autochthonous 8.0 11.4
Non-autochthonous 92.0 88.6
37